The Art Neuro Weblog

By Request...
A long-time reader had this to pass along. I might have posted this up previously, in which case I'm sorry for the repetition.

The US standard railroad gauge (width between the two rails) is 4 feet, 8.5 inches. That's an exceedingly odd number. Why was that gauge used? Because that's the way they built them in England, and the US railroads were built by English expatriates.

Why did the English build them like that? Because the first rail lines were built by the same people who built the pre-railroad tramways, and that's the gauge they used.

Why did "they" use that gauge then? Because the people who built the tramways used the same jigs and tools that they used for building wagons which used that wheel spacing.

Okay! Why did the wagons have that particular odd wheel spacing? Well, if they tried to use any other spacing, the wagon wheels would break on some of the old, long distance roads in England, because that's the spacing of the wheel ruts.

So who built those old rutted roads? The first long distance roads in Europe (and England) were built by Imperial Rome for their legions. The roads have been used ever since. And the ruts in the roads? Roman war chariots first formed the initial ruts, which everyone else had to match for fear of destroying their wagon wheels.

Since the chariots were made for (or by) Imperial Rome, they were all alike in the matter of wheel spacing. The United States standard railroad gauge of 4 feet, 8.5 inches derives from the original specification for an Imperial Roman war chariot. Specifications and bureaucracies live forever.

So the next time you are handed a specification and wonder what horse's a** came up with it, you may be exactly right, because the Imperial Roman war chariots were made just wide enough to accommodate the back ends of two war horses. Thus, we have the answer to the original question.

Now the twist to the story..............
There's an interesting extension to the story about railroad gauges and horses' behinds. When we see a Space Shuttle sitting on its launch pad, there are two big booster rockets attached to the sides of the main fuel tank. These are solid rocket boosters, or SRBs. The SRBs are made by Thiokol at their factory in Utah. The engineers who designed the SRBs might have preferred to make them a bit fatter, but the SRBs had to be shipped by train from the factory to the launch site. The railroad line from the factory had to run through a tunnel in the mountains. The SRBs had to fit through that tunnel. The tunnel is slightly wider than the railroad track, and the railroad track is about as wide as two horses' behinds. So, the major design feature of what is arguably the world's most advanced transportation system was determined over two thousand years ago by the width of a horse's behind!

I've read this before and wondered about its verasity, but it is an interesting tale (pardon the pun) of sorts.

Interesting Commentary On The Remilitarisation Of Japan
Another Long-time reader sent in a link for this article regarding the rise of Mainland China as a superpower. It's written by one Chalmers Johnson who amongst other things is the president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, a non-profit research and public affairs organization devoted to public education concerning Japan and international relations in the Pacific. A famous man in certain circles.

In it was this bit that caught my attention:

Japan Rearms

Since the end of World War II, and particularly since gaining its independence in 1952, Japan has subscribed to a pacifist foreign policy. It has resolutely refused to maintain offensive military forces or to become part of America's global military system. Japan did not, for example, participate in the 1991 war against Iraq, nor has it joined collective security agreements in which it would have to match the military contributions of its partners. Since the signing in 1952 of the Japan-United States Security Treaty, the country has officially been defended from so-called external threats by U.S. forces located on some 91 bases on the Japanese mainland and the island of Okinawa. The U.S. Seventh Fleet even has its home port at the old Japanese naval base of Yokosuka. Japan not only subsidizes these bases but subscribes to the
public fiction that the American forces are present only for its defense. In fact, Japan has no control over how and where the U.S. employs its land, sea, and air forces based on Japanese territory, and the Japanese and American governments have until quite recently finessed the issue simply by never discussing it.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has repeatedly pressured Japan to revise article nine of its Constitution (renouncing the use of force except as a matter of self-defense) and become what American officials call a "normal nation." For example, on August 13, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated baldly in Tokyo that if Japan ever hoped to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council it would first have to get rid of its pacifist Constitution. Japan's claim to Security Council seat is based on the fact that, although its share of global GDP is only 14%, it pays 20% of the total U.N. budget. Powell's remark was blatant interference in Japan's internal affairs, but it merely echoed many messages delivered by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the leader of a reactionary clique in Washington that has worked for years to remilitarize Japan and so enlarge a major new market for American arms. Its members include Torkel Patterson, Robin Sakoda, David Asher, and James Kelly at State; Michael Green on the National Security Council's staff; and numerous uniformed military officers at the Pentagon and at the headquarters of the Pacific Command at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

America's intention is to turn Japan into what Washington neo-conservatives like to call the "Britain of the Far East" -- and then use it as a proxy in checkmating North Korea and balancing China. On October 11, 2000, Michael Green, then a member of Armitage Associates, wrote, "We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the [U.S.-Japan] alliance." Japan has so far not resisted this American pressure since it complements a renewed nationalism among Japanese voters and a fear that a burgeoning capitalist China threatens Japan's established position as the leading economic power in East Asia. Japanese officials also claim that the country feels threatened by North Korea's developing nuclear and missile programs, although they know that the North Korean stand-off could be resolved virtually overnight -- if the Bush administration would cease trying to overthrow the Pyongyang regime and instead deliver on American trade promises (in return for North Korea's agreement to give up its nuclear weapons program).

Instead, on February 25, 2005, the State Department announced that "the U.S. will refuse North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's demand for a guarantee of 'no hostile intent' to get Pyongyang back into negotiations over its nuclear weapons programs." And on March 7, Bush nominated John Bolton to be American ambassador to the United Nations even though North Korea has refused to negotiate with him because of his insulting remarks about the country.

Japan's remilitarization worries a segment of the Japanese public and is opposed throughout East Asia by all the nations Japan victimized during World War II, including China, both Koreas, and even Australia. As a result, the Japanese government has launched a stealth program of incremental rearmament. Since 1992, it has enacted 21 major pieces of security-related legislation, 9 in 2004 alone. These began with the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992, which for the first time authorized Japan to send troops to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Remilitarization has since taken many forms, including expanding military budgets, legitimizing and legalizing the sending of military forces abroad, a commitment to join the American missile defense ("Star Wars") program -- something the Canadians refused to do in February 2005 -- and a growing acceptance of military solutions to international problems. This gradual process was greatly accelerated in 2001 by the simultaneous coming to power of President George Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi made his first visit to the United States in July of that year and, in May of 2003, received the ultimate imprimatur, an invitation to Bush's "ranch" in Crawford, Texas. Shortly thereafter, Koizumi agreed to send a contingent of 550 troops to Iraq for a year, extended their stay for another year in 2004, and on October 14, 2004, personally endorsed George Bush's reelection.

Whoa. There's more, but take a breather because there are a few things a bit amiss here that clearly Chalmers Johnson has avoided mentioning.
There was a time when Japan was 'Britain of The Far East'. It was even an Ally in WWI. Japanese ships escorted the ANZAC troops to Egypt. They fought the Germans in the Pacific and TiengTsin. As late as 1925, Japan was 'Britain of The Far East'.
Then of course the Great Depression and WWII happened. :)

The significant pressure on Japan to rearm has been going on since thre 1980s when Ronald Reagan and Yasuhiro Nakasone were serving long terms in office in both countries. It didn't start in the 1990s. Former PM Nakasone used to visit the Yasukuni shrine and predictably it caused a lot of bellyaching from Communist China through the 1980s. Declaring Japan as the unsinkable aircraft carrier for the USA (coming from a former Logistics Officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy) didn't help much either. The point is, the US pressure to get Japan to rearm is not a new issue.

In fact it goes back to the very idealism (and I'm being polite here) of the 'Peace Constitution' devised and vetted by General Headquarters run by General Douglas MacArthur back in the post-WWII occupation days. The feeling went that the Japanese were so damn horrible an enemy, in order not to ever fight them again, they should remove the military option from the Japanese 'forever'. Now, the Prime Minister of Japan at the time was ex-Foreign Affairs Ministry veteran Shigeru Yoshida, who brazenly declared, "What we lost in the war, we'll bring back at the negotiating table." The way PM Yoshida had it figured, if MacArthur wanted to be stupid enough to make Japan swallow (and uphold) a 'Peace Constitution' on some psuedo-moral grounds, then the pseudo-morality led to a 'moral responsibility' for the USA to protect Japan as its ward.
As in:
USA: "You shall never punch your neighbour again"
Japan: "But what happens if we get picked on by bullies"
USA: "Then, we shall protect you."
Japan: "You sure now?"
USA: "Absolutely."
Japan: "Word of Honour?"
USA: "We are Americans. We stand by our word. We are not treacherous like you Japanese."
Japan: "Okay. We're holding you to it. Just sign here..."

Thus 'moral' responsibility gave rise to the Security Treaty between the two nations. It was a case where Yoshida was quite willing to rid Japan of having a glorious military if it meant saving money. After all, wartime budgets under martial rule had the Army and Navy claiming 70% of the Annual Budget. Yoshida probably thought, 'good riddance to that cost; if the Americans want to shoulder that, then they're free to that folly'.

It only took until the outbreak of the Korean War for the old Imperial Army and Navy personnely to be required for service once again. To this end, 'Special Police' were formed out of what remained of the old Army and Navy, which developed into the present day Land and Maritime Self Defense Services we see today. The point was, it only took five years to find out that the Peace Constitution was a load of codwallop in the world of real-politik, and Yoshida was smart enough to make the USA foot the bill for its hubris.

The point is, the Security Treaty that keeps the USA involved in protecting Japan costs a tonne of money that subsequent US Administrations since Truman have found bothersome, if not downright hard to bear. And so this has given rise to ever escalating pressure on Japan to rearm; and at each turn, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has dragged its heels. After all, the argument ran, "you made us sign that Peace Constitution you dreamt up, and now you want us to do what?"

The LDP were busy building up the economy of a shattered nation. They had no interest in seriously spending more on weapons; espacially if it meant bothersome criticism from neighbouring Nations clamouring for more reparations. Instead the LDP-led Japanese government kept paying bloodmoney in the form of Overseas Development Aid. It was much cheaper to buy favour than rearm and stand tall.
You can bet your bottom dollar that Japan likes the USA to continue shouldering these military costs, take the necessary risks and responsibilities inherent in the military option. Why would they give up that free ticket earned by Shigeru Yoshida in 1945?

On the other hand, if the path truly is for Japan to rearm and then fend for itself militarily, then the USA would have to reckon on the fact that the Pacific War was fought for no good discernible reason. Afterall, there were always diplomatic options available to resolve the differences of the 1930s. Always. Right down ot the last minute. Kichisaburo Nomura was in Washington D.C. until the last minute with full represenational responsibilities for negotiations. Cordell Hull and FDR chose not to speak to him. It was only the bloody-mindedness of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration that preciptated the Hull Note and Pearl Harbour and all the rest.

If Japan does rearm and becomes the 'Britain of the Far East' once again, Americans would really have to ask themselves "what the hell was the War in the Pacific about?"

- Art Neuro